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Abstract
Given the outstanding progress that convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) have made on natural image classification and object recogni-
tion problems, it is shown that deep learning methods can achieve very
good recognition performance on many texture datasets. However, while
CNNs for natural image classification/object recognition tasks have been
revealed to be highly vulnerable to various types of adversarial attack
methods, the robustness of deep learning methods for texture recognition
is yet to be examined. In our paper, we show that there exist small image-
agnostic/univesal perturbations that can fool the deep learning models
with more than 80% of testing fooling rates on all tested texture datasets.
The computed perturbations using various attack methods on the tested
datasets are generally quasi-imperceptible, containing structured patterns
with low, middle and high frequency components.
1 Introduction
Texture is one of the essential features for objects or identities in the physi-
cal world. It usually yields visually distinguishable properties to provide mid-
level hints for human/machine vision. For example, Convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) [1, 2, 3, 4] are regarded as highly effective solutions to ImageNet
ILSVRC dataset [5], a challenging large-scale image classification dataset con-
taining more than one million of real-world images categorized into one thou-
sand classes. In the inference process of CNNs, local features are collected and
combined by convolutional filter banks from previous layers, where textures in
the input image are the valuable local information to collect for the convolu-
tional filters in the first few layers. Moreover, a recent study has shown that
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ImageNet-trained CNNs rely on textures rather than shapes to recognize im-
ages/objects [6], which can indicate that textures play a pivotal role in the
success of the CNN models for object recognition.
In fact, texture recognition is already a widely explored topic. Before the
prevalence of CNNs, researchers try to extract or design discriminative features
from texture patterns via various kinds of methods, such as Scale-Invariant Fea-
ture Transform (SIFT) [7], Bag-of-Words (BoWs) [8], Vector of Locally Aggre-
gated Descriptors (VLAD) [9], Fisher Vector (FV) [10] and so forth. Given the
superior performance of CNNs on object recognition problems since the early
2010s [11], Cimpoi et al. [12] took advantage of pretrained CNN features and pro-
cessed them with different encoders to achieve cutting-edge performance on tex-
ture recognition problems. Furthermore, inspired by dictionary learning, Zhang
et al. [13] proposed a Deep Texture Encoding Network (DeepTEN), making end-
to-end learning possible, followed by some variants to improve DeepTEN [14, 15].
Despite the outstanding performances of CNNs, some researchers have casted
doubt on their robustness against small perturbations [16]. Specifically, it has
been shown that there exist small and image-agnostic perturbations, called uni-
versal perturbations, that can fool CNN classifiers, resulting in a significant
decrease in classification accuracy over a natural image set [17]. However, to
the best of our knowledge, the performance of deep neural networks (DNNs) un-
der universal adversarial attacks has not been studied for texture recognition.
Given the properties of repetitive/redundant information and spatially invariant
representation in texture images, what is the effect of universal perturbations
on the performance of DNNs for texture image recognition? Can the perfor-
mance be severely degraded by universal perturbations that are computed with
much less training images and classes than those computed on ImageNet? Do
the adopted modules and architectures in the deep learning models for texture
recognition really improve the ability and robustness of the baseline DNN mod-
els? In order to answer these questions, we train four available deep learning
models on six texture datasets and conduct adversarial attack experiments with
existing universal attack algorithms. We perform the universal attacks with
the assumption that we have full knowledge about the targeted model (white-
box attack), such as its architecture, weight and gradient information, and that
relevant training data is available (data-dependent). After the computation of
the perturbation, we use testing data to evaluate the attack performance. The
rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of
related work on texture recognition and adversarial attacks. Our experimental
setup and obtained performance results are described in Section 3. Finally a
conclusion is given in Section 4.
2
2 Related Work
2.1 Texture Recognition
Here we only consider the end-to-end deep-learning models for texture recog-
nition, which most of the existing universal attack methods were proposed to
fool. Inspired by previous dictionary learning and residual encoding techniques
such as VLAD and Fisher Vector, Zhang et al. [13] proposed a learnable residual
encoding layer, where dictionary codewords and assigned weights can both be
updated via backpropagation, and plugged it before the fully connected layer of
the ResNet structure. Further, to take the local spatial information into consid-
eration, Xue et al. [14] combined the features after the global average pooling
layer with the outputs of the encoding layer proposed in [13] through a bilin-
ear model [18] in their deep encoding pooling (DEP) network. Recently, Hu
et al. [15] presented the idea of multi-level texture encoding and representation
(MuLTER) by assembling multi-stage features extracted using the DEP module
after each residual block before the final fully connected layer. Intuitively, all
these architectures are derived from the vanilla ResNet architecture.
2.2 Universal Attacks
White-box universal perturbations that are computed using relevant training
data can produce the stronger attack ability than other kinds of universal per-
turbations such as data-independent [19] and black-box ones [20]. Based on the
image-dependent attack algorithm DeepFool [21], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al [17]
produced universal adversarial perturbations (UAP) by accumulating the image-
dependent updates iteratively over the training images to fool the targeted CNN
model. Generative adversarial networks were adopted to generate the universal
perturbation in [22, 23], where the adversarial networks were set as the tar-
geted models. Poursaeed et al [22] trained the generative network using a fixed
random pattern as input to produce the generative adversarial perturbation
(GAP), while Mopuri et al [23] introduced both fooling and diversity objec-
tives as the loss function of their network for adversary generation (NAG) to
learn the perturbation distribution in the latent space. Recently, the authors
of [24] and [25] used mini-batch based stochastic projected gradient descent
(sPGD) during training by maximizing the average loss over each mini-batch,
enlighted by another image-dependent attack algorithm called iterative gradient
sign method (IGSM) or projected gradient descent (PGD) [26]. Most recently,
Deng and Karam [27] proposed an enhanced universal projected gradient de-
scent (UPGD) based on the UAP framework by replacing DeepFool with the
stronger PGD attack and boosting the computation process with momentum.
3 Experiments
We consider six texture datasets in order to examine the recognition perfor-
mance of the deep learning models under various unviersal attacks. The Ma-
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Table 1: The numbers of data used for training the networks (training set),
computing the perturbation (attacking set) and testing (testing set).
Dataset training set attacking set testing set
MINC [28] 48,875 5,750 5,750
GTOS [29, 14] 93,945 9,381 6,066
DTD [30] 3,760 1,880 1,880
4DLF [31] 840 360 360
FMD [32] 900 300 100
KTH [33] 2,376 231 2,376
terials in Context (MINC) Database [28] is a large real-world material dataset.
In our work, we adopt its publicly available subset MINC-2500 with provided
train-test split. There are 23 classes with 2500 images for each class. Xue et
al. created the Ground Terrain in Outdoor Scenes (GTOS) [29] dataset with 31
classes of over 90,000 ground terrain images and the GTOS-mobile [14] with the
same classes but with a much smaller number of images (around 6,000 images).
As in [14], we adopt the GTOS dataset as the training set and test the trained
models on the GTOS-mobile dataset. In the rest of our paper, we use MINC
and GTOS to refer to the MINC-2500 and the combined dataset of GTOS and
GTOS-mobile, respectively.
We also adopt some smaller texture datasets. The Describable Textures
Database (DTD) [30] includes 47 categories with 120 images per category. The
4D light-field (4DLF) material dataset [31] consists of 1200 images in total for
12 different categories. An angular resolution of 7× 7 is used for each image in
the dataset and we only use the one where (u, v) = (−3, 3) in our experiments.
The Filckr Material Dataset (FMD) [32] has 10 material classes and 100 images
per class. The KTH-TIPS-2b (KTH) [33] comprises 11 texture classes, with
four samples per class and 108 images per sample.
We evaluate the performance of ResNet [4], DeepTEN [13], DEP [14] and
MuLTER [15] on the six texture datasets. For each dataset, the training set
is used to train the models for texture recognition, the attacking set includes
images that are randomly sampled from the training set for computing the
perturbations, and the testing set is to evalute the performance without and
with universal attacks. The number of images for each purpose is listed in
Table 1. We use the train-test split that is either provided in the dataset or
suggested in [13]. To extract the attacking set, we randomly sample 10% of the
images in the training image set for the GTOS/KTH dataset, one-third of the
training images for the FMD dataset and a number of training images that is
equal to the number of testing images for MINC, DTD and 4DLF separately.
3.1 Implementations
We train the four deep learning models on each of the six texture datasets and
then conduct the mentioned universal attacks on 24 trained classifiers. Similar
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to the training process of deep learning models, the perturbations are computed
only on each of the attacking sets, whose images are randomly sampled from
the corresponding training set, and then are evaluated on the testing data.
Training. The deep learning models are finetuned via transfer learning
based on the ResNet backbones which are pretrained on ImageNet. We follow
the suggestions of backbones on different datasets in [13, 14]. In regard to
the network backbone, we use pretrained ResNet501 for MINC, DTD, 4DLF
and FMD and pretrained ResNet18 for GTOS and KTH. Following the same
training strategies in [14, 15], we train our models with only single-size images.
Similar to the data augmentation strategies in [13], the input images are resized
to 256 × 256 and then randomly cropped to 224 × 224, followed by a random
horizontal flipping. Standard color augmentation and PCA-based noise are used
as in [11]. For DeepTEN, DEP and MuLTER, the number of codewords is set
to 8 for the ResNet18 backbone and to 32 for the ResNet50 backbone. The
learning rate is initialized to 0.01 and decays every 10 epochs by a factor of 0.1,
with a momentum coefficient of 0.9. The training process stops after 30 epochs.
Attacking. Generally, no data augmentation is used while computing the
universal perturbations. But in our implementation, given the small number of
data for 4DLF, FMD and KTH, we use random cropping and horizontal flip-
ping to prevent overfitting problems for perturbations. We perform UAP [17],
GAP [22], sPGD [25] and UPGD [27] on the trained models. In [22], the authors
mention two ways to optimize the perturbation - (1) minimizing the least-likely
class loss between the original prediction with the least probability and the
perturbed prediction; (2) maximizing the orginal loss between the perturbation
prediction and the true target. We refer to the former as GAP-llc and to the
latter as GAP-tar. For GAP and sPGD, we use a mini-batch size of 32 when
computing the perturbation. The defaulted parameters are used for all the con-
sidered attack methods, except for UPGD whose hyperparameters (i.e., initial
learning rate and decay factor, momentum, etc.) were varied to maximize the
performance for the computed perturbations in terms of fooling rate. Typically,
we stop the training process of the perturbation and report the results when
the fooling rates are unable to increase by more than 0.5% within 5 epochs for
all the attack methods. For UAP, we choose its best results in terms of fooling
rate within 20 epochs given that its learning curves were observed to fluctuate
drastically. All perturbations are constrained within an l∞ norm of 10 on 8-bit
images (about 0.04 for the normalized image scale [0, 1]).
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Performance Comparison Results Without Attacks
We show the classification accuracies of each model without attacks on the six
texture datasets in Table 2. For MINC and GTOS datasets, it seems that the
1According to [34], the adopted ResNet50 backbones are slightly different from [4], where
the first convolutional layer with a kernel size of 7 is replaced by three cascaded 3 × 3
convolutional layers.
5
Table 2: Top-1 accuracies on the testing sets for texture recognition. Bold
number in each column indicates best performance on the corresponding dataset.
MINC GTOS DTD 4DLF FMD KTH
ResNet 81.5 80.1 71.4 72.5 70.0 79.9
DeepTEN 81.7 77.8 61.2 79.2 82.0 83.5
DEP 81.5 77.5 73.0 82.2 81.0 79.9
MuLTER 81.8 77.9 71.6 83.6 84.0 80.6
Table 3: Fooling rates by the universal attacks against different models. Bold
number indicates best performance on the corresponding model in each column
within the same dataset and italic number denotes best performance on the
corresponding dataset over different models and attack methods.
ResNet DeepTEN DEP MuLTER mean ResNet DeepTEN DEP MuLTER mean
MINC GTOS
UAP 86.6 73.1 59.8 66.4 71.5 51.0 27.7 31.6 39.0 37.3
GAP-llc 74.9 84.4 87.1 80.3 81.7 45.9 49.6 57.6 54.6 51.9
GAP-tar 94.1 94.8 94.5 94.2 94.4 69.5 81.5 72.5 79.0 75.6
sPGD 93.8 94.3 93.1 93.4 93.7 51.8 74.9 70.0 76.3 68.3
UPGD 93.4 93.7 93.1 93.7 93.5 78.0 77.5 72.4 77.8 76.4
DTD 4DLF
UAP 26.2 36.6 32.4 38.9 33.5 83.6 72.5 79.2 77.2 78.1
GAP-llc 55.7 75.3 61.4 76.0 67.1 69.7 75.6 81.1 72.2 74.7
GAP-tar 72.5 86.2 81.1 83.6 80.9 87.5 84.2 90.0 89.4 87.8
sPGD 70.9 83.9 78.8 84.5 79.5 86.4 84.4 85.6 81.7 84.5
UPGD 71.8 82.6 80.5 79.9 78.7 88.3 88.3 86.1 81.9 86.2
FMD KTH
UAP 65.0 49.0 39.0 50.0 50.8 75.8 41.9 62.0 42.0 55.4
GAP-llc 51.0 67.0 78.0 55.0 62.8 48.2 57.6 8.4 45.1 39.8
GAP-tar 90.0 94.0 88.0 88.0 90.0 68.9 79.2 75.9 80.2 76.1
sPGD 89.0 93.0 87.0 89.0 89.5 69.2 79.9 72.8 80.6 75.6
UPGD 79.0 75.0 86.0 69.0 77.3 85.7 78.5 74.3 75.2 78.4
modifications based on the ResNet backbone that were proposed in DeepTEN,
DEP and MuLTER result in trivial improvements or even worse performances
as compared to the baseline ResNet model. The residual encoding layer in
DeepTEN significantly improves the classification performances on 4DLF, FMD
and KTH datasets but fails on other larger datasets. Similarly, as compared to
DeepTEN, DEP only shows higher classification accuracies on DTD and 4DLF.
The core idea of MuLTER is the ensemble of multi-level features, which is built
upon the DEP architecture. It presents an overall increase of top-1 accuracies
based on the baseline ResNet model except for the DTD dataset.
3.2.2 Attacking Results
In Table 3, we list the fooling rate results on the considered six texture datasets.
It can be observed that UAP exhibits a large performance gap in terms of
fooling rate as compared to the other attack methods, with a significantly lower
performance on the GTOS and DTD datasets. For the two GAP variants,
GAP-llc results in significantly lower fooling rates as compared to GAP-tar,
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clean image ResNet DeepTEN DEP MuLTER
MINC
GTOS
DTD
4DLF
FMD
KTH
Figure 1: Adversarial examples on different datasets. For each dataset listed in
the first column, we show samples of adversarial examples perturbed by GAP-
tar against all four targeted models (third to six columns). We also show the
original image in the second column as reference.
while GAP-tar results in the best performances on most targeted models for
the MINC, GTOS, DTD and FMD datasets. As for sPGD and UPGD, they
produce competitive results that are close on average to the top performing
GAP-tar attack method on the considered datasets.
In addition, GAP-tar, sPGD and UPGD can easily fool all the four mod-
els that are trained for the MINC dataset on over 93% of the testing images.
Concerning the vulnerability of the targeted models, attacking DeepTEN yields
the highest fooling rates on four (MINC, GTOS, DTD and FMD) out of the
six datasets. Overall, the highest fooling rate on each dataset can exceed 80%,
meaning that an effective universal perturbation generally exists for the evalu-
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clean image ResNet DeepTEN DEP MuLTER
MINC
GTOS
DTD
4DLF
FMD
KTH
Figure 2: Adversarial examples on different datasets. For each dataset listed in
the first column, we show samples of adversarial examples perturbed by sPGD
against all four targeted models (third to six columns). We also show the original
image in the second column as reference.
ated texture datasets, even with a significantly small attacking set (including
less than 500 images) or few classes.
3.2.3 Visual Examples
Figure 1 and 2 show, respectively, some visual examples of images perturbed
by GAP-tar and sPGD against four models for each dataset (Section 3.2.2).
Typically, perturbations are quasi-imperceptible given the relatively small l∞
norm. The perturbations for the GTOS dataset consist of colored patterns and
blobs, which are more perceivable than the other types of patterns. Accord-
ing to Figure 3, most of the perturbations show dense texture patterns, which
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MINC
GTOS
DTD
4DLF
FMD
KTH
UAP GAP-llc GAP-tar sPGD UPGD
Figure 3: Visualization of perturbations computed using different universal at-
tack methods (first row) against DEP models on the six datasets (first column).
The perturbations are rescaled for visibility.
are considered as middle/high frequency components, while some perturbations
especially for the GTOS dataset also include colored structured patterns (e.g.,
spots and strips).
4 Conclusion
To evaluate the robustness of deep learning models for texture recognition
against universal attacks, we train four deep learning models (ResNet, DeepTEN,
DEP and MuLTER) on six texture datasets (MINC, GTOS, DTD, 4DLF, FMD
and KTH) separately and conduct five existing universal attack methods (UAP,
GAP-llc, GAP-tar, sPGD and UPGD) by targeting all the models. The ob-
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served results show that highly effective universal perturbations exist over all
tested datasets regardless of training data size and class number, achieving fool-
ing rates of more than 80%. We also observe that these perturbations contain
various components like colored flat regions (low frequency), intense lines (mid-
dle frequency) and dense textures (high frequency).
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